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STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action by plaintiff Richard Ross to modify
a California divorce decree, with a counter-claim by Carol
Ross for judgement as to arrearages in child support and
alimony.

The State of Utah, Department of Social Services,

joined the action with a claim against plaintiff for reimbursement of welfare paid to defendant.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
This case was tried by the lower court sitting without
a jury which modified the divorce decree in favor of plaintiff
and granted judgement for defendant on the counter-claim and
order to show cause in the amount of $24,457.00, representing
arrearages of alimony and child support, and after giving
plaintiff credit for alimony payments in the amount of $5,000.00
as money paid by plaintiff towards a down payment on a home
purchased by the two parties.

Judgement was also granted for

the State of Utah, Department of Social Services, in the
amount of $1,544.00 representing reimbursement of welfare paid
to defendant, Carol Ross.
Plaintiff appealed that part of the lower court judgement
granting defendant $24,457.00 in arrearages and the State
$1,544.00 in reimbursement.
Defendant is not appealing the part of the judgement or
order modifying the California divorce decree as indicated in
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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plaintiff's brief, but is appealing that part of the courts
decision granting plaintiff credit in the amount of $5,000.00
towards the alimony arrearages.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent and Cross-Appellant, Carol D. Ross, seeks
an affirmance of the judgement of the lower court against the
Plaintiff-Appellant Richard Ross for $24, 457. 00 in arrearages
of alimony and child support and further asks that the court
overturn the lower courts decision to grant a credit to plain·
tiff in the amount of $5,000.00 toward alimony arrearages,
representing the amount paid by plaintiff toward the down payment of a home purchased by the parties.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Defendant-Respondent and Cross-Appellant, hereinafter
referred to as defendant, or Mrs. Ross, does not agree fully
with the statement of facts as presented by plaintiff and will
herein recite her interpretation of the facts and will speci·
fically refute facts set forth in plaintiff's brief which
she controverts.
The parties final divorce hearing was held on February

19, 1971 in California, wherein defendant was awarded alimony
of $150. 00 per month and child support of $100. 00 per month
for each of three children.

Plaintiff, Mr. Ross was present

at the divorce hearing and heard the court order him to pay
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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the amounts specified above. (T. 7, 34)
On February 20, 1971, only one day after the divorce
hearing, Mr. Ross left the State of California and moved to
Dallas, Texas specifically to avoid the obligations of the
divorce decree and to hide from Mrs. Ross and any one who
would try to enforce plaintiff's obligations under the decree.
(T. 9,10,82,155)

To be certain that no one would find him

plaintiff lived under an alias or an assumed name, Richard
Henderson. (T. 6,10,155)

He lived in Dallas, Texas for

approximately 5 years (T. 10)
Mrs. Ross did not hear from Mr. Ross until October of
1972, at the earliest (T. 60), and Mr. Ross continued to
conceal his whereabouts to defendant in their few conversations
by telling her that he was living in Colorado rather than
Dallas, Texas. (T. 34,60,70)
Plaintiff and his mother Mrs. McKendrick, testified -that plaintiff sent to his mother on the average $200.00 a
month until August of 1972 for the benefit of plaintiff's
children. (T. 13, 82-87) Defendant on the other hand denied
ever receiving anything from plaintiff's parents except the
usual gifts that grandparents give to grandchildren, such as
on birthdays and Christmas. (T. 15,59)
It is undisputed that plaintiff never did send any money
directly to defendant as required by the divorce decree, or to
the State of Utah on behalf of defendant for either alimony or
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 4 -

child support until approximately March of 1973. (T. 35)
Defendant began receiving from plaintiff at that time very
small sporadic payments until August 1973 when plaintiff
started sending $232.00 a month to the Bureau of Recovery
Services, which in October 1973 he reduced to $225.00 a
month . (T. 36)

These payments were made until pl.aintiff

moved to Salt Lake permanently in February of 1976.
Plaintiff testified that a Mr. Theodore Zambos of the
Bureau of Recovery Services, acting as agent of the State and
defendant, relieved plaintiff from all back-payment obligations to defendant in October 1973, and for any future obligations above $225. 00 a month. (T. 30, 161-164)

Mr. Zambos,

however, testified that it never was his practice to relieve
a defaulting husband from the obligations under the divorce
decree, nor did he believe that

he had the authority to do

so

(T. 115,117,119,121)
Certain contacts were made between Mr. and Mrs. Ross
from October 1972 through December 1975, including telephone
conversations and a visit by plaintiff to Salt Lake City in
February 1973. (T.34,60,62-4)

During some of those tele-

phone conversations and the February 1973 visit there was sOll!
discussion about child support payments wherein Mrs. Ross spe(
fically asked Mr. Ross if he was going to pay the amount that
the court in California had ordered him to pay and Mr· Ross
responded that he would never pay that amount. (T. 34 · 67)
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Defendant testified that she never protested the amount she
received other than to plaintiff, as she felt that it was
"hopeless". (T. 135)
In December of 1975 plaintiff came to Salt Lake to spend
Christmas with the children and in early February 1976 he
moved to Salt Lake and has been a resident ever since.
Tr-as some discussion

There

in the Christmas visit of 1975 concerning

plaintiff moving to Salt Lake permanently so that he could be
around the children, but defendant testified that she was very
skeptical about plaintiff's return,(T. 48) and did not urge
plaintiff to come. (T. 140)
Prior to plaintiff's move to Salt Lake and since the time
of the divorce the parties never actually discussed "backpayments" or arrearages of child support and alimony. (T. 18,
19, 44, 48,68,133-34)

Plaintiff

did however testify that in

their conversations defendant led him to believe that he did not
owe her for back-payments. (T. 162)

This testimony, however is

inconsistent with his earlier testimony that back-payments were
never discussed. (T. 17, 18)
Mrs. Ross testified that she was never willing to make
any concessions concerning the back-payments of alimony and
child support or the amount that plaintiff was obligated to

pay

per month in the future. (T. 152)
As plaintiff made preparations to leave Dallas, Texas and
come to Salt Lake in January or February of 1976 he apparently
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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sold a home that he had been making house payments toward of

$137. 00 a month (T. 23), and prior to his arrival in Salt Lah
he had a job secured which he testified paid him approximate!:
the same salary as he was making in Dal las, Texas. (T. 23 ' 2i,
Sometime after plaintiff's arrival in Salt Lake, plain·
tiff and defendant lived together in the same house where defr
dants parents, Mr. & Mrs. Fred Robinson, were residing, altho.
the parties did not remarry.

(T. 21, 46-48)

Plaintiff and de!

dant lived with the Robinson's until September of 1976 and dur.
that period of time Mr. Ross paid $400. 00 total to J:A'.r. Robins1
(T. 95}, while Mrs. Ross was at the same time paying her fath1

$200. 00 a month. (T. 21-22}

All of the food expenses and mos!

of the other household expenses that Mr. Ross took advantage
of were paid during that period of time by Mr, Robinson. (T.;
In September of 1976 plaintiff and defendant bought a
home together and plaintiff subsequently moved out of the hom1
two months later. (T. 48}

From September 1976 to December Bi

plaintiff paid the mortgage payments on the home.

Mr. Ross

testified that he always considered the home bought by the
parties as his home and Mrs, Ross to have no interest therein
(T. 25-26, 175). and in fact Mr. Ross brought a lawsuit again;
Mrs. Ross to quiet title and remove her from possession of thi
home.

(T. 182)
Over the seven years since the divorce plaintiff has gir!

gifts and provided other benefits to the children and defendar
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Mrs. Ross testified, however, that much of the payments claimed
by plaintiff at the trial were made out of a joint checking
account owned by the parties or from plaintiff's own account
into which he had deposited defendants earnings. (T. 45,146)
ARGUMENT
POINT

I

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR OR
ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN FINDING THAT THE
DOCTRINES OF ESTOPPEL AND LACHES DID NOT
APPLY IN THE INSTANT CASE TO RELIEVE
PLAINTIFF FROM CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY
A._-q_p..EARAGES.
Plaintiff contends that the doctrines of "estoppel"
and "laches" should apply in the instant case to relieve him
from alimony and child support arrearages.

It is defendants

position, however, that plaintiffs reliance on these doctrines
is inappropriate for the following reasons: (1)

The standard

on appeal or scope of review requires that this court affirm
the lower courts ruling that the doctrines were not applicable,
(2)

The equitable estoppel doctrine requires "representations:

from defendant to release the arrearages which were not found
in the instant case, (3)

Laches cannot be found from mere

silence alone on the part of the defendant, (4)
not suffered a substantial detriment, and (5)

Plaintiff has

Any alleged

agreement between palintiff and Recovery Services did not
constitute estoppel or laches on the part of defendant.
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A

Standard on Appeal
Plaintiff has correctly defined within his brief the
scope of review and the standard to be applied to this case
by this court.
divorce

Since the case involves enforcement of a

decree obligation it is an equity case.

However, as

this court has noted before on numerous occasions the
Supreme Court must affirm the trial court unless its decision
was obviously and clearly against the weight of the evidence
and there was a clear abuse of discretion.

Hall v. Hall,

7 Utah 2d. 413, 326 P.2d. 707 (1958)
Another important principle of appellate review is that
the Supreme Court will, in an equity case respect the trial
courts opportunity to observe the demeanor and determine the
credibility of the witnesses in a situation where there is
conflict in the testimony.

In Corbet v. Corbet, 24 Utah 2d

237, 472 P.2d 430, (1970), the court stated:
"We recognize the correctness of the
defendants assertion that under § 9 of
Article VIII, Utah Constitution, this
court may review the facts in equity
cases. Nevertheless, it is well established that we make allowance for the
advantaged position of the trial judge
in close proximity to the parties and
the witnesses; and we do not disturb
his findings and judgement merely because
we might have viewed the matter differently,
but would do so only if it appeared th~t
the evidence clearly preponderat7s a~ainst
them, or that he has so abused his d7s~re-. e
tion or misapplied the law, that an inJustic
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding
for digitization provided
the Institute
Museum and Library Services
has resulted."
472by P.2d
at of432,433.
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See also Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P.2d 194 (J949),
and Reimann v. Baum, ll5 Utah 147, 203 P.2d 387 (1949),
As is already obvious from the statement of facts there
are several places in the record of this case where there is
a conflict in the testimony.

It is especially important to

note that there is a conflict as to whether defendant made
certain representations that the arrearages of alimony and child
support as an obligation of Mr. Ross were relieved or forgiven.
The trial court apparently chose to believe the testimony of
Mrs. Ross after observing her demeanor and determining her
credibility as compared to Mr. Ross.

B.
An Application of the Doctrine of Equitable Estoppel
Requires Representations from Defendant to Release or
Forgive Arrearages which were not Present in the
Instant Case
1. The Applicable Law and Defendants Conduct
The other briefs filed in this case note that the
elements of estoppel generally include some action on the
part of one party to induce another into a position where he
suffers some substantial detriment or damage.

J.P. Koch, Inc.

v. J.C.Penny Co, Inc., 534 P.2d 903 (Utah 1975),

Larsen v.

Larsen, 5, Utah 2d. 224, 300 P,2d 596 (1956), Baggs v. Anderson,
528 P.2d 141, (Utah 1974).

Plaintiff's application of the

doctrine
to Funding
the for
facts
of provided
the instant
case
seemsandto
Sponsoredestoppel
by the S.J. Quinney
Law Library.
digitization
by the Institute
of Museum
Library Services
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depend entirely on the case of Larsen v. Larsen, supra.
The most that can be said about that case, however, is that
the language in "dictum" required certain "representations"
or actions on the part of the former wife which would induce
the former husband not to pay the arrearages and change his
1

position to his detriment.

It should be observed, however,

that Larsen was not a definitive holding for or against
either party but a remand to the trial court for further fino
ings on the issues of estoppel and laches.
The remand of the case and subsequent Utah cases reveal
that the facts as found in the instant case are not the kind
of "representations"

sufficient and necessary to invoke the

doctrine of estoppel.
The facts in Larsen itself can be clearly distinguishec
from those herein.

In Larsen the former wife brought anacti1

to enforce back-payments and arrearages against the former
husband covering a period from 1946 to the filing of the actL
in July 1955.

The former husband alleged and testified that'

had attempted to make payments of child support as required~'
the divorce decree but that such payments had been refused b]
former wife and she allegedly told him that all she wanted
from her former husband is that he should refrain from tryin1
see her or the child.

The first representation from the

former wife apparently caine when Mr. Larsen approached her
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to what his responsibilities would be to the child if he
decided to go on a mission for his church and she allegedly
told him that she would not require him to pay for the child
while he was on the mission.

Mr. Larsen further testified

that he telephoned his former wife a few years later upon his
return from the mission and was told that he was not to interfere
with their lives.

Additional facts include that the former

wife married and her new husband was providing support for the
child, and that based on the representations of the former wife
Mr. Larsen also remarried and took on other obligations with a
new family.

The lower court failed to make findings on the

issue of estoppel and entered a judgement for the plaintiff and'
as already noted the Supreme Court remanded.
In plaintiff's brief it is not mentioned that upon remand
the trial court held that the doctrine of estoppel applied to
only part of the past-due arrearages in child support but that
the former husband was still obligated for a five year period,
1950-1955, and that the eguitable doctrines did not apply for
the last five years.

Mr. Larsen once again appealed to the

Supreme Court, which affirmed the trial court in the case of
Larsen v. Larsen, 9 Utah 2d 160, 340P.2d 421 (1959).
1

This

latest opinion from the court is very brief and does not indicate which of the facts as they were revealed in the first
opinion supported the finding that the doctrine of estoppel
applied to the first three years but not the last five years
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of the divorce period.
Plaintiff's reliance on Larsen should encompass t he fie:
result before a proper comparison to the facts of the instan:
case can be made.

In Larsen

there were fairly clear "reprei.

tations" which are not found in the instant case or were at
least not accepted by the trial court.

(Finding of Fact No.

The former wifes statements and requests in Larsen that Mr. l
leave them alone is quite a bit different from the hopeless
condition of l'f.rs. Ross herein, who was left alone with the
children one day after the final divorce hearing.

Mr. Ross l

California to hide out in Dallas, Texas and took on an alias
assumed name to be certain that no one could find him. (T.
82, 155)

~.

Of course because of the final result in Larsen th1

same kind of "representations" would not necessarily be suffl
cient to support the doctrine of "estoppel", even assuming ti
were present herein.
Further, the Larsen case must be examined in light of
later opinions from the Supreme Court that have cited and/or
distinguished Larsen.
left the State of Utah

In Hall v. Hall, supra,

the formen:

not too long after being awarded chi'.

support from a divorce decree.

Evidence at the trial reveali'

defendant tried to deliver support money to plaintiff but co:
not contact her even by a private detective.

The court note:

that, "it must be conceded that plaintiff kept herself pretr
Sponsored by the S.J.much
Quinney beyond
Law Library. reach."
Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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back payments owed by defendant in Hall, and the former husband
appealed relying on the first Larsen v, Larsen opinion as
grounds for overturning the ruling of the lower court.

The

Supreme Court affirmed the trial court and apparently limited
the Larsen opinion to the requirement that the wife give certain
"representations" that the husband will not be obligated for
the back-payments.

The court stated:

"Plaintiff stated that she did not seek
out defendant to require payment because she
was trying to enjoy a peaceful life and
it was not worth it to her at that time.
Here any similarity to the Larsen case
disappears. Such statement does not
reflect any representation to defendant
that he would not be held accountable
for the su ort mone
as was the basis
o t e Larsen ecision,
Emp
ed)
326 P.2d at 709.
.
A similar case to Hall is McClure v. Dowell, 15 Utah 2d
324, 392 P.2d 624 (1964), wherein the defendant made regular
payments based on an Alabama divorce decree but could not make
the payments for two years solely because the plaintiff concealed herself and the children due partly to a trip to Europe.
The trial court awarded the past-due child support and defendant appealed saying he was relieved of such payments relying
on the first Larsen v. Larsen case.

The Supreme Court affirmed

the lower court indicating that they did not think the Larsen
case appropo, and noted defendant should have sought relief
in the Alabama forum. 392 P.2d at 625.
Plaintiff in his brief argues that the overall conduct
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 14 -

of Mrs. Ross together with plaintiff's testimony concerning
the alleged understanding between plaintiff and defendant as
to back child support is enough to apply the doctrine of
"estoppel" to the instant case.

However, the actions of the

former wives in both Hall and McClure

seem far more aggregioi

than any actions or conduct of defendant in the instant case.
For example plaintiff emphasises over and over again in his
brief that defendant did not contact any State Officials when
she was aware of plaintiff's address and he points further to

her conduct in never having filed an action earlier to enforc'
the arrearages or never having lodged any formal protest or
complaint.

Certainly, however, defendant never did conceal

herself from plaintiff as in Hall and McClure, but on the
contrary it was Mr. Ross who hid himself from Mrs. Ross for

a period of almost two years.

Mr. Ross did not have the righ

to believe he was relieved of any support obligations in the
instant case merely because Mrs. Ross did not file an earlier
action or report his whereabouts to the State of Utah.

Plain

tiff's only relief as suggested in McClure , was to modify th
California decree.
Another important case since the original Larsen opinio
is Smith v. Bray, 11 Utah 2d. 217 357 P.2d 189 (1960) wherein
the lower court granted a judgement for delinquent support
money payments for a period of 8 years to the former wife.
that case the former husband testified that he was requested
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to stay away by his former wife and he further testified that
he was "led to believe that they did not want anythlng from
him. "

The former husband appealed the lower courts ruling

and again attempted to rely on the first Larsen v. Larsen,
opinion.

The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court, noting

simply that the instant case amply supported the courts
finding that there was no "laches or equitable estoppel".

It

is important to note that there was a conflict in the testimony in that case and that the former husband felt that he
was led to believe that the support obligations wo111ld not be
required of him.

The facts in the instant case are somewhat identical
to the facts in Smith.

Mr, Ross testified that the general

conversations between plaintiff and defendant in the early
part of 1973 led him to believe that defendant would not
"hassel" him for back alimony and support as long as he took
care of the kids. (T. 172-3_) This testimony of plaintiff is
as firm as he ever becomes in the trial concerning an understanding between plaintiff and defendant that all past alimony
and child support obligations were forgiven.

Earlier in the

trial plaintiff gave the following testimony:
(By Mr. Williams} Alright, Now
from 1971 through to 1975, Mr. Ross,
did you and your former wife ever
discuss the amount or the fact th~t
you owed some back payments of alimony and child support?
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney LawA:
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Q:

A:

Q:

Never discussed that from 1971
to 1975?
The conversations we had led me to
believe that I did not owe her any
back alimony,

A:

I am not asking you that,
I am
asking did you ever have a conversation with her about the amount
that she or that you had an obligfor back-payments of alimony and
child support,
No.

Q:

You never discussed it. O.K, (T. 19)

Al though the testimony is somewhat confusing plaintiff
admits that the two parties never actually discussed the fact
of back payment or arrearages of alimony and child support ani
from all the testimony given by plaintiff i t appears clear th:
if he was led to believe that he did not owe the back-payment
it was not based on any "representation" of Mrs. Ross.
Mrs. Ross' testimony, on the other hand, clearly reveal;
that the parties never actually discussed back payments and
the only time the subject of support was discussed related to
whether Mr. Ross was going to pay the amount required of h~
under the divorce decree and his constant response that he wo~
never pay that amount, (T. 34, 67, 135)

As to whether there wa:

ever a discussion concerning "arrearges" Mrs. Ross testified
as follows:
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"Q:

A:

Q:
A:

(By Mr. Williams) In fact
you have already testified here
t~day haven't you, that you never
did have a conversation about backpayments with the plaintiff until
you were living together? Isn't that
true?
Yes. (see T. 48)
Well, what concessions were you
willing to make about back-payemnts
at that time (late December 1975 and
early January 1976), if any?
~wasn't willing to make any concessions. How can you forgive something
like that? That's a lot of debt.
He owed me a lot of money.

The testimony of Mrs. Ross is credible for many reasons
including the fact that one day after the divorce hearing she
found herself alone in terms of supporting herself

~nd

the

children and plaintiff deliberately concealing his whereabouts
to defendant

until sometime in 1973.

Mrs. Ross further testified that from the time that she
first came in contact with

~.r.

Ross after the divorce until the

time that he moved to Salt Lake in February of 1976 that there
was never an agreement or understanding between the two parties
that he need not pay her any alimony, or that he need not worry
about paying more than the $225.00 a month that he was paying
since October 1973. (T. 44)
On page 16 of plaintiff's brief he states that defendant
was not "truthful" in testimony that she gave earlier in the
trial and refers to a dialogue betweem Mr. Sykes and her to
prove her alleged inconsistency about conversations between
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plaintiff and defendant concerning "back-payments".

An

obvious reading of the dialogue however reveals that the
parties talked only about the future child support Mr.
Ross was going to pay and did not relate to "back-payments"
at all.
Mrs. Ross does not deny that the parties talked about
child support but is very emphatic about the fact that all
the conversations related to payments Mr. Ross was going to
make in the future.
in her testimony.

Hence there is never any inconsistency
Prior to the conversations referred to,

plaintiff had made absolutely no efforts to pay defendant
any "alimony" or "child support" and the conversations bet·

ween the two at that time referred to what Mr. Ross was goini

to start providing for the children and as Mrs. Ross testifiE
Mr. Ross was very adamant about the fact that he would never
pay the amounts set forth in the decree. (T. 34, 67, 135)
One final decision handed down after the original

~

opinion that is worth noting is French v. Johnson, 16 Utah 2d
358, 401 P.2d 315 (1965).

In that case plaintiff brought pR

ceedings against defendant to collect back-payments for a ten
year period.

The lower court relieved the defendant of past

payments applying the doctrines of "estoppel" and "laches".
The former wife appealed and as noted in the Supreme Courts
opinion the case of Larsen v. Larsen was discussed at great
length.

The Supreme Court reversed the lower court and state'
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"The facts show no representation
eit~er.explicit or implicit, by '
plaintiff to defendant with respect
~o ~iscontinuation of payments, and
it is doubtful if such circumstances
would be of prime imaortance. Mere
silence over a perio of time will
not raise an estoppel where there is
no legal or moral duty to speak. The
court did not condition the payments
upon a request for such by plaintiff."
(emphasis added) 401 P.2d at 315-316.
In the instant case the lower court undoubtedly chose
to believe Mrs. Ross when there was conflicting testimony as
to whether certain representations were given.

In the absence

of representations plaintiff can only point to "mere silence"
on the part of defendant and as clearly noted in French Mrs.
Ross never had a legal or moral duty to seek after the unpaid
amounts as the divorce decree did not award alimony and child
support payments contingent upon the request of the former wife.
2. The Effect of the Alleged Reconciliation
Finally it should be considered whether the supposed
reconciliation between plaintiff and defendant in February of
1976, resulting in their living together until November of 1976,
constitutes enough of an implied representation or understanding
that the prior obligations in arrears for alimony and child
support would be forgiven or cancelled by defendant.

Defendant

testified that she never did urge plaintiff to come to Salt Lake
City to live with his family again, and in fact was always
skeptical about plaintiff's desire to move back in with the
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family.

(T. 4 7, 148)

Part of defendant's testimony on this

point is as follows:

"Q:

A:

Will you please tell us what "Our
reactio~ was, your feelings w~re,
about Dick Ross moving back to
Salt Lake?
I was very skeptical about it.
There had been a lot of things
happen in the past. I had to
struggle and scratch for a long
time." er. 47)

Further Mrs. Ross testified that they did not even
start living together as "man and wife" until plaintiff had
been living in the Robinson's home for about a month, (T. 14:
It is obvious that defendant was willing to try the relation·
ship again, but it is also obvious from her testimony that sl
was not willing to concede and forgive Mr. Ross that easily.
Mrs. Ross had no reason to forgive all of the arrearage
merely because plaintiff was going to move back in with the
family.

For two years Mr, Ross had concealed his whereabout:

to the family and when he started making payments it was on'.
own terms as he made it very clear to Mrs. Ross that he wouli
never pay the amount set forth in the decree. (T. 34, 67)
If the alleged reconciliation of the parties is suffic'.
for an application of the doctrine of "estoppel" such holdir«
would apparently allow a former husband like Mr. Ross to rel:'
a past obligation of many thousands of dollars by a simple gi
of reconciliation without anything permanent.

Under the

· t ion
·
would be erasi
plaintiff's theory the bac k -payment o bl iga
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whether the former husband left the day after the alleged
reconciliation or many years later.

Of course the reconci-

liation in the instant case was for a relatively brief period
of time.
As further grounds for relieving plaintiff of his
obligations under the divorce decree or to further show the
need for estoppel he tries to impress this court with the
alleged "inequities" dealt to him by the original divorce
action, and the gains of Mrs. Ross by the decree.

This court

has stated before that it will not look to those matters in
a case where the wife is seeking a judgement for back-payments
in alimony and child support.

In Osmus v. Osmus, 114 Utah 216,

198 P.2d 233, (1948), the court stated:
"The fact that plaintiff received $5,000.00
for the equity in the home did not excuse
the defendant from complying with the order
of the court. The existence of independent
means might be a factor to be considered by
the court in fixing alimony or in considering
a petition for modification of the decree, ...
but no discretion is left, to a divorced
husband, to determine whether he should or will
comply with an alimony decree ... " 198 P.2d
at 235-236.

c
The Doctrine of Laches is not Applicable
to the Instant Case
Although plaintiff states that he is relying on the
doctrine of "laches" to justify his failure to pay much of his
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the application of the doctrine except as it may be intermingled with the doctrine of "estoppel".

Defendant has

already cited the case of French v. Johnson, supra, wherein
the court reversed the lower courts decision to relieve the
former husband on the basis of estoppel and laches.

A much

earlier case that is similar to French is Openshaw v. Opensha·
105 Utah 574, 144 P. 2d 528 (1943).

In that case defendant hai

failed to make payments regularly to the court as required
under a modification decree and plaintiff filed an applicatior
for a judgement covering unpaid installments for a period of
8 years.

The lower court granted a judgement for the plaintii

in an amount substantially less than the total amount in arrn
partly because the court through its own motion invoked the
doctrine of laches on behalf of defendant.

The Supreme Court

reversed and stated:
"But mere inaction or delay short
of a period of limitations, in the
enforcement of payment of an obligation already accrued, without
more, is insufficient upon which to
predicate-laches,
The evid~~~~·~dd~~~d·t~ th~·~ffect
that on the few occasions when he
visited the children and their mother
in California, the plaintiff did not
harass him for payment of arrearages,
is not sufficient upon which to conclude that she was guilty of laches."
144 P.2d at 530-531.

0

Whether or not Mrs. Ross harassed or hasseled plaintiff
to a great degree during the telephone conversations concernin
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support obligations, is irrelevant under the facts and law
as applied in Openshaw.

Clearly, she is not guilty of "laches".

Further a demand upon the plaintiff for back-payments is
even less relevant when he states that he will never pay the
amount he was ordered to pay in the decree. (T. 34,67,135}
In 24 Am Jur 2d, 865 §758 it is stated:
"Likewise a demand is not necessary if
the party ordered to make the payment
asserts that he will never obey the
decree."
The court in Openshaw v. Openshaw, supra, recognized
that because of the actions of the former husband that it may
well have induced the belief upon the part of the wife that
efforts to enforce judgement for the past due alimony would be
frivolous.

Defendant testified that she felt her "protest"

would be "hopeless". (T. 135}
As with the doctrine of "estoppel" plaintiff has failed
to demonstrate sufficient facts suggesting that defendant was
guilty of "laches" and that plaintiff should be therefore
relieved from his divorce decree obligations.
D

Plaintiff Has Not Suffered A Legal Detriment
As noted earlier and as fully represented in plaintiff's
brief an essential element in applying the doctrines of
"estoppel" or "laches" is that there must be some substantial
legal detriment suffered by the one relying on the doctrine.
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This element was noted in the case of Baggs v. Anderson,
--

supr

"An essential requirement is that there
must be some conduct of the obligee which
reasonably induces the obliger to rely
thereon and make some substantial change
in his position to his detriment." (emphasis added). 528 P. 2d at 143.
Even assuming that the appropriate actions or representations are present that would indicate the application of
the equitable doctrines, plaintiff's reliance therein must
fail for lack of sufficient detriment.
Again, an examination of Larsen v. Larsen, supra, is
valuable as a comparison to the facts of the instant case,
especially since plaintiff places so much relience on the
language of that opinion.

As already noted Mr. Larsen had bet

told by his former wife that he need not provide support
money, and as a result he gave up his earning capacity for
several years to serve a mission for his church.

Further upor

his return he was given more representations about his need

tr

provide support and he subsequently remarried and undertook
other obligations that he would have never undertaken had he
known he was obligated for the prior

accrued support money.

In the instant case Mr, Ross has not suffered any detri·
ment that is anything like the change of position noted in
Larsen,

and even if he had such a detriment it may not be

sufficient to invoke "estoppel" or "laches" inasmuch as this
court found in the second Larsen case that estoppel did not
apply for the last 5 years that the defendant had not made
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payments.
On page 38 of plaintiff's brief he itemizes several
things which supposedly suggest a detriment sufficient to
invoke the equitable doctrines of laches and estoppel.

Of

those noted is the fact that plaintiff quit his job in Dallas,
Texas to move to Salt Lake.

Mr.

Ross testified, however,

that prior to moving that he already had a job "lined-up"
at Ken Garff's in Salt Lake and that he started to work soon
after his arrival. (T. 23, 27)

Having a job at approximately

the same pay as he was making in Dallas was an important
consideration to plaintiff before he decided to come to Salt
Lake as was confirmed by Mrs. Ross in her testimony.

She

stated:
"A;

... He wanted to check and see
what wages were like here and see
if he could find a job. So I sent
him the yellow pages of the phone
book. And we had a few telephone
conversations and he found work
in Garffs. And the wa~es he said
were the same as whate was makin
t ere in Texas, so e move
(emphasis added), (T. 46)

A comparison of plaintiff's income tax ~:returns of 1975
(while still in Dallas) and 1976 (Salt Lake) reveals an increase
in earnings of approximately $4,000 in 1976, (plaintiff's
exhibits 10 and'll),but, the W-2 forms for 1975 show a total
·
· that year that i's somewhat more than the
amount o f earnings
in
1975 reported income. (Plaintiff's exhibit 10}

The documentary

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-

- 26 -

evidence concerning plaintiff's income is difficult to rely c
not only because of the difference in the W-2 forms versus t:.
income tax returns, but also because plaintiff testified that
he has performed work "on the side" that was not reported on
his income tax returns.

(T.224-225}

The important point is that Mr. Ross himself testified
that he thought his earnings in 1975, while in Dallas, were
about $12, 000. 00 (T. 27), which would put him slightly under
his earnings in 1976.

Whatever his actual income, he made

certain before his arrival that he had a job lined up that
offered similar wages, and plaintiff cannot now claim that
he suffered a legal detriment in quitting his job in Dallas,
Texas.
Plaintiff lists other items of detriment such as rentin:
a trailer to haul his belongings to Salt Lake, pursuading his
f't::i:end to drive one of his cars to Salt Lake and buying his
friend a one-way ticket baek to Dallas.

He also includes

selling his boat and trailer that he testified he could not
bring to Salt Lake, and finally moving away from many of his
friends.

These particular actions clearly do not reflect the

kind of detriment or change in position that would allow the
doctrine of "estoppel" to apply.

Plaintiff does not allege

that ~e suffered any financial loss or gave up any earnings

or

obligated himself for any support obligations that he was not
.f
. d. orce decree.
already required to make un d er t h e Ca 1 i ornia iv
'l
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in Dallas, Texas suggests that he perhaps had the means to
pay more support to defendant and the family than he was
contributing.
In addition to the detriment claimed by plaintiff one
must examine the benefits derived by plaintiff's move to Salt
Lake, which is the major action he ties his detriment to.
For example, plaintiff sold a home in Texas that required a
monthly payment of $137.00 and upon his arrival in Salt Lake
he moved into the Robinson home and over a seven (7) month
period paid only $400.00 and in return received living quarters,
his meals and all of the benefits attached to the Robinson
household. (T. 21-23, 93-94}

Plaintiff testified that he paid

$100.00 a month to Mr. Robinson but only produced four $100.00
checks at trial, (Plaintiff's exhibit 23), and Fred Robinson
who was called as a witness by plaintiff testified that plaintiff never paid him anything over and above the four payments
of $100.00 submitted as evidence. (T. 95)

These facts are

particularly interesting in light of plaintiff's testimony that
he now spends approximately $150,00 a month himself for food.
(T. 22)

Mr. Ross also claimed as an item of detriment that he
purchased a home with defendant in September of 1976 and paid
most of the down payment of $5,000.00.

The very fact that the

home was not purchased until September of 1976 and that plaintiff had arrived in Salt Lake some seven months earlier reveals
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that this is not the kind of detriment plaintiff can rely
on as another element of estoppel, assuming that there was
some type of representation or some type of understanding
necessary for the other element of "estoppel" or "laches"
before the arrival to Salt Lake.

Further the home that

was purchased was not a gift to defendant, which might be c:
to a legal detriment, but was a home for both parties and
their children, even though

plaintiff did r;:o last long in

the home as he was there for approximately two months. (T. 4:
Further, plaintiff, testified over and over again at
trial that he considered the home as entirely his own and thi
defendant did not have any interest therein (T. 25-26,175),'
he even brought a "quiet title action" to remove defendant
from the premises. (T. 182)

It is interesting that plaintif'.

should consider the purchase of the home as a detriment whil1
at the same time becoming very adamant as to the ownership
rights therein.

Certainly if everything worked out the way

Mr. Ross intended, the purchase of the home would be a sub·
stantial benefit and gain to him under the market conditions
as they existed then and now.
. n1·
Finally, plaintiff attempts to demonstrate a "d etrl.ll1e

by noting that he paid a personal judgement of defendant.
(Plaintiff's brief p. 38) .

I t must be pointed out that this

cannot be considered a "detriment" as required for the appli· incurr'
cation of the doctrine of laches and estoppel as h e is
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no further obligations to defendant over and above that which
he already had.

The payment of the personal judgement in

the amount of $700,00 is only a very small item when compared
to the amount of money he had not paid prior to that time in
child support and alimony.

Interestingly enough plaintiff

also claims this payment on the judgement as satisfaction
of alimony and/or child support which further verifies the
inapplicability of this payment for a "detriment".

There is

no evidence in the record that defendant agreed to accept
the foregoing payment as satisfaction of support obligations.
E

Alleged Agreement Between Plaintiff and Recovery
Services Did Not Constitute Estoppel and/or Laches
Defendant agrees with the State of Utah that the doctrines
of estoppel and laches are not supported by any alleged agreements between Mr. Theodore Zambos of the Bureau of Recovery
Services and Richard Ross.

For the sake of avoiding repetition

defendant accepts and supports the arguments and points noted
by the State of Utah in its brief in support of the overall
position that the equitable doctrines cannot be applied from
the facts relating to the contacts between Mr. Ross and Mr.
Zambos.
Among those points that will be emphasised in the States
brief and of which defendant fully supports and agrees with
following:
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1.

The assignment given the State by Mrs. Ross was

not of unlimited scope but was one restricted in nature and
not authorize the compromise of "all claims'.'
2.

Notwithstanding the interpretation of the StatE

authority under the assignment, there was no agreement expn
or implied whereby the State waived its own or Mrs. Ross'
arrearages.
3.
Mr. Zambos

The court did not error in allowing testimony o'
on cross-examination as to his procedure as an

investigator.
Defendant wishes now to only comment about the probablE
interpretation of the telephone conversations wherein plainti:
claims that there was an agreement with Mr. Zambos to relievE
all "past" alimony and child support obligations belonging tc
Mrs. Ross.

Plaintiff has cited verbatim the testimony of Mr

Ross on page 29 and 30 of his brief and the State of Utah
adequately discusses the probable interpreations of this
conversation in its brief.

However, it cannot be over-emphas'

that the statements allegedly made by Mr. Zambos to Mr. Ross
do not necessarily relieve plaintiff of all past-due obligatic
under the divorce decree.

The following testimony should aga:

be examined as given by plaintiff;
"Q:

(By Mr. Sykes) Did Mr. Zambos say
with respect -- or was there any
conversation at all, any mention
of the past-due payments, that the
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department had paid?
A: I had asked if I owed anything from
what I had already paid her, and he said,
No.

Q: That was it?
A: Yeah. Otherwise, I could make payments.

Q: Did he say anything about the amounts

accrued prior to the time she went on
welfare?
A: No . (T, 164)
The testimony cited above is not inconsistent with
the interpretation that plaintiff certainly did not owe
anything from what he and already "paid" Mrs. Ross and that
Mr. Zambos did not specifically tell Mr. Ross that he was
relieved of obligations during the time that she was not on
welfare.
Plaintiff's exhibit 16, which is referred to by plaintiff as confirmation of the above mentioned telephone conversation does in no way refer to the "arrearages" of alimony
and child support and in fact there is no mention in the
exhibit at all concerning "alimony".
Defendant submits that the more logical interpretation
of the contact between Mr. Zambos and Mr. Ross is that the State
of Utah was arranging with Mr. Ross future payments while Mrs.
Ross was on welfare.
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POINT II
ANY AGREEMENTS BETWEEN THE PARTIES
AND/OR THEIR AGENTS TO MODIFY FUTURE
CHILD SUPPORT MUST FAIL FOR LACK OF
CONSIDERATION AND FOR REASONS OF
PUBLIC POLICY.
Plaintiff alleges that there were certain "agreements"
that relieved

him of his future obligation to pay the total

amount as required by the 1971 California divorce decree.
It is first of all claimed that plaintiff and defendant durir
the telephone conversations from October 1972 to February H:
and in the Febraury 1973 visit to Salt Lake, agreed or had ac
understanding to the effect that defendant would not consider
plaintiff liable to pay the full amount under the divorce
decree if he would simply start paying support fer the childff
(Plaintiff's brief p. 14)

The testimony used to support thes'

claims is of course chiefly that of plaintiff and the statem!
he claims were made by defendant are not altogether clear abo.
what if any obligation plaintiff is relieved of. (T. 15-17)
Further there were apparently other telephone conversations
claimed by plaintiff in the summer and fall of 1973, December
1975, January 1976, and at various times thereafter that
allegedly relieved plaintiff of the total obligations of the
divorce decree for the present and future support payments fo:
the children.

(T. 19, 159, 160-1, 164-5, 172)

Mrs. Ross denie:

that she ever gave Mr. Ross authority to pay less than the
$450.00 per month required by the decree.
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One additional alleged agreement that plaintiff relies
on a great deal in his brief is the one allegedly made by plaintiff with Mr. Theodore Zambos of the Bureau of Recovery Services
of the State of Utah.

Mr. Ross claims that he telephoned Mr.

Zambos and they "agreed" over the telephone that if he paid
$225.00 a month for child support that would be his only obligation for the past and future. (T. 30-31)

As already noted

in this brief the alleged statements made by Mr. Zambos as
testified to by Mr. Ross do not relate
but to the future. (T. 30-31)

to the past obligations

Plaintiff also claims that this

conversation and agreement was reaffirmed in a letter sent
by Mr. Zambos to Mr. Ross on October 4, 1973.

(Plaintiff's

exhibit 16)
Plaintiff further alleges that Mr. Zambos had the authority to enter

into this agreement with Mr. Ross because Mr.

Zambos was acting as the agent of defendant having received
an "assignment of collection of support payments" from Mrs.
Ross in October of 1972. (Plaintiff's exhibit 4, Plaintiff's
brief 27-28)
There should be no question that the agreement allegedly
entered into in October of 1973 between plaintiff and Mr.
Zambos and the alleged agreements between plaintiff and defendant
at various times pertain in some degree to a "modification"
of future child support.

Plaintiff had an obligation under the

1971 divorce decree to pay $100.00 a month for each of the
three children and he has never, since the divorce, paid to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 34 -

defendant or to the State of Utah on her behalf more than
$225.00 - $232.00 per month.
A well settled principle of Utah law is that the
former husband and wife may not agree to

mo d"f
1 y c h"ld
l.
suppor

obligations of the father as established in the court decree.
This principle was made clear in the much discussed case of
Larsen v. Larsen, 5 Utah 2d. 224, 300 P.2d 596 (1956):
"In Price v. Price,4 Utah 2d. 153, 289
P.2d 1044, we held that because the
State is interested in the childs welfare
the parents cannot effectively release
future payments of support money by
agreeing with the other to that effect."
300 P.2d at 598.
This principle is very clearly related in Baggs v.
Anderson, supra, with facts that are apparently quite similar
to the situation as alleged by plaintiff in the instant case.
In ~ the parties were divorced in Wyoming on June 24,
1970, wherein the pl.aintiff was awarded $200. 00 a month for
child support.

Defendant made payments through September

of 1971 but missed the October 1971 payment.

Apparently afte:

several phone calls and conversations plaintiff and defendant
executed a Wl."itten agreement on November 1, 1971 that if,
"the defendant would pay the October and November payments,
(total $400. 00 which he then paid) and promised to make the
$200. 00 payment for December ($100. 00 of which he later paid)
he would be relieved from the payment of any further support
money."
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In July of 1972, an action was brought to enforce all
of the accrued unpaid child support by the former wife, and
the trial court granted a judgement to plaintiff excepting
therefrom the amount accruing for half of December 1971 to
July 1972 applying the doctrine of "estoppel".

The Supreme

Court reversed the lower court and indicated that the doctrine
of estoppel could not be applied to relieve plaintiff of
"future" child support obligations.

The court stated:

"From an examination of the facts here
it will be seen that the defendants claim
of estoppel relates to the first situation
stated above: the right to receive current
and future child support. This claim is
based primarily on the ayreement si~ned by
the arties on November , 1971, an statements o the p ainti
an Mr. Baggs w ic
defendant avers had the effect of excusing
him from paying future paheents of child
support. This court has eretofore had
occasion to deal with that problem; and has
held that the right to receive current and
future money belongs to the minor children;
and that it is not subject to being bartered
away, or estopped, or in any way defeated
by the conduct of the parents or others .
.. . . . We furth~~-~b~~~~~·t~t-there are other
obstacles to the invocation of that doctrine.
A serious one is that we cannot see wherein
the defendant ave an consideration for the
c aune agreement t at e wou
not ave to
pai any future su;~ort moner. That is, he
neither gave anyt ing of va ue, nor suffered
any legal detriment for that promise. Under
the decree he was already obligated to make
the payments of $200.00 a month. Such an
agreement to do that which on~ is alrea~y
required to do does not constitute consideration for a new promise." (emphasis
added) 528 P.2d at 143.
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The courts opinion in ~ makes it quite clear that
plaintiff in the instant case cannot enter into an agreement
to "modify" any future child suoport obligations because, (:
it is a violation of public policy, and, (2) must fail becaus:
the lack of consideration given.

Even if the court finds th:

some back payments or arrearages were somehow erased, it is
clear that Mr. Ross would still be obligated for $300.00 a
month child support from the period that the alleged agreeme:
took place.

Therefore, his payments from that period were

deficient.
POINT III
PLAINTIFF CANNOT SUBSTITUTE BENEFITS
TO THE CHILDREN OR THE DEFENDANT IN
SATISFACTION OF SUPPORT OBLIGATIONS
UNDER THE DIVORCE DECREE.
A

The Applicable Law and Alleged Benefits
Conferred Generally
Plaintiff claims that as a matter of equity he should
be given credit for many benefits, gifts and contributions
made to defendant and to the children over the seven year per
since the divorce, that were not payments made as required ~1
the divorce decree to defendant herself.

As observed in pla~

tiff's brief this court has held that a father and former bu>'
may not substitute bene f its for the Obl igations imposed by tt'
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divorce decree.

Harris v. Harris, 14 Utah 2d 96, 377 P . 2d

1007 (1963), Stanton v. Stanton, 30 Utah 2d 315, 517 P.2d
1010 (1974).

In this respect Utah has apparently followed

the majority rule as noted in 47

A.L.R 3d 1031, 1035:

" ..... It can be generally stated that
most cases have gravitated towards the
view that a father should not be allowed,
as a matter of law, credit for expenditures made while the child is in his
custody or for other voluntary payments
made on behalf of the child which do not
specifically conform to the terms of the
decree."
In Harris v. Harris, supra,

the trial court found the

defendant, former husband, in contempt of court for wilful
failure and refusal to abide by the order of the divorce decree
for the payment of the support money for the minor children.
The decree required defendant to pay $100.00 per month as
support.

Defendant contended that he was in substantial

compliance with the court order as he was paying approximately
$50.00 a month as support, and in addition he was spending
$10.00 a month on the children and carrying certain medical
insurance which covered the medical expenses of the children.
He was also allowing plaintiff the right to claim the children
as dependants on her income tax returns.

In regard to this

position claimed by defendant the court stated:
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courts conclusion that defendant should
be held in contempt is supported by the
law and evidence." (emphasis added) 377
P.2d at 1009.
In

Stanton v. Stanton, supra,

the court stated that

the defendant could not "unilaterally" decide that "he would
not pay the support money and offset it by favors conferred
upon the children."

517 P.2d at 1014

Defendant suggests that the language in Stanton would
require not only a mere "consent" from the divorced wife,
as suggested by plaintiff 1 but a firm "bilateral agreement"
that the benefits conferred by plaintiff can be used as a
substitution of the payments required by the divorce decree,
and even then it is not certain whether the dictum in the Stan:
opinion would relieve the husband as there does not appear to
be a case decided in Utah where benefits have been held to be
satisfaction for the support obligations.
In any case the facts here do not reveal a bilateral
understanding between Plaintiff and defendant to substitute an:
of the benefits claimed by plaintiff as satisfaction of the
divorce decree.

The items of benefit referred by plaintiff

will be discussed in the order they appear in defendants exhH'.'
2, or as otherwise. indicated below.

With respect to all of

the items mentioned there is no evidence in the record that an'
of the benefits conferred were agreed or consented to by defen·
dant to be used as satisfaction or in substitution of plaintifi
obligation
under
thefor digitization
decree.provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Money Sent to Mrs. McKendrick
The payments allegedly sent by plaintiff to his mother
in California while plaintiff was hiding out in Dallas, Texas
cannot be considered satisfaction of the decree.

These pay-

ments are itemized in part in defendant's exhibit 2, schedule
A.

Although plaintiff's mother testified that she used all

of the amounts sent to her by her son for the benefit of the
children (T. 82-87), Mrs. Ross denied ever receiving anything
from palintiff's parents for the benefit of the children except
the usual gifts that grandparents give to grandchildren, such
as on birthdays and Christmas. (15, 59}
Even assuming all of the money was used for the benefit of
the children, of which there is no documentary evidence to support,
there is absolutely no evidence in the record that Mrs. Ross in
any way agreed to consented to accept the benefits and gifts given
to the children bu plaintiff's mother as substitution of the
obligations imposed on palintiff in the divorce decree.

Mrs.

McKendrick, the plaintiff's mother testified that she never did
give any money directly in the form of cash to defendant (T. 91),
and there is no testimony in the record that plaintiff's mother
ever told Mrs. Ross that the alleged benefits conferred were
from money supplied by plaintiff.
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Checks in Schedule B of Exhibit 2
Defendant has no quarrel with the fact that most of thi
checks itemized on Schedule B, can be used as satisfaction o:
the support obligations of plaintiff and have in fact been
given credit by the court as admitted to by defendant.

Howe•:

the one check listed to American Airlines and dated June 26,
1973 should not be considered as substitution for the support
obligations in the decree, and apparently was not considered'
by the lower court.

Plaintiff explained that this money was

used for the time he flew his children down to Texas to spena
two weeks with him. (T. 15)
Checks in Schedule C of Exhibit 2
It is interesting to observe that plaintiff claims the
$400. 00 paid to defendants father, Fred Robinson over a sevei
month period as satisfaction of support obligations.

This

money was paid during the time that plaintiff was receiving a
rent free home in which to live by the Robinsons, as well as
free meals. (T. 21-22.46-48)
Checks in Schedule D of Exhibit 2
All of the checks written on Schedule D relate to the
period of time during which plaintiff and defendant were livii
together with the children.

Plaintiff would like the court

to believe that the total amount listed on that schedule repr:
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sents amounts from out of his own pocket and reasonably should
be used as substitution of the alimony obligations.

However,

defendant made it very clear in her testimony that during much
of this period of time plaintiff and defendant had a joint
checking account and during the rest of the time period Mrs.
Ross would simply give to Mr. Ross the money she received from
her own employment

and he would deposit this money into the

account in his name for the overall expenses of the two parties.
(T. 49, 145-146)

Checks in Schedule E of Exhibit 2
As in schedule D, most of the checks in Schedule E relate
to the period of time that the parties were living together
either with the Robinsons or in their own home.

The fact that

the checks were paid out of the joint funds of the parties
applies at least until December

1976,

Checks in Schedule F of Exhibit 2
Plaintiff lists in this schedule payments to various
utilities and attempts therein to show a satisfaction of child
support obligations.

Plaintiff admitted in testimony that he

himself took advantage of the natural gas, the garbage collection
and the electricity during the time these checks were paid and
admitted that therefore much of this money must be considered for
his own support. (T. 175)

Furthermore, the checks were again

paid at the time when the parties mingled their individual sums.
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Payments on House
Plaintiff claims satisfaction of the divorce decree
obligations by the monthly mortgage payments and other payments in Schedule G. relating to the home purchased jointly\
the parties in September of 1976.

Plaintiff testified adamari:

that he has always considered the home that was jointly pure[,.
ased by the parties as his home and therefore considered defr
dant to have no interest therein even though she paid approxi·
mately $700. 00 towards the down payment and the deed shows he:
as a lawful joint-tenant of the property. (T.24, 175)

Plain·

tiff also testified that even though he wants to claim the
mortgage payments as satisfaction of support obligations he''
not willing to allow defendant the opportunity to deduct fro1
her income tax the interest paid on the mortgage payments
(T. 26), and was never willing to concede any interest in the
home to defendant, and in fact brought a quite title action t:
remove her from possession of the home. (T. 182 )

This

testimony reflects the inconsistency in plaintiff's testimon:
and the general lack of welfare or concern toward defendant
that plaintiff exhibited.

If the mortgage payments

and othe

house payments were in substitution of the amounts required ir
the decree, plaintiff should have considered the house payment
to be made by defendant.
Furthermore, all of the house payments represented ab~
to plaintiff assuming everything worked out as he planned,
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because any payment toward the home would have to be considered
an investment by him with very little risk.
Plaintiff paid an additional $5,000.00 toward the down
payment of the home and this item will be discussed in detail
in Point IV of defendant's brief.
Again it should be mentioned that with respect to all of
the items mentioned above there is no evidence that defendant
agreed or consented to accept them as "satisfaction"
assuming any of them are from plaintiff's own money.
B

Trial Court Did Not Accept Plaintiffs
Position on Satisfaction
The trial court in the instant case apparently was not
willing to accept all of the aforementioned "benefits" as
satisfaction of the support obligations.

The decision of the

trial court is amply supported by the very recent Utah Supreme
Court decision of Ciraulo v. Ciraulo, 576 P. 2d 884 (Utah 1978).
The facts of that case are strikingly similar to the ones in
the instant case and reveal that some two years after the
Ciraulo's were divorced they began living together in Salt
Lake and this period of reconciliation lasted for approximately
five months.

They again reunited in the early part of 1971

and continued to live together as a family until January 1974.
Plaintiff's version of the evidence was that the amount of
support money unpaid by the defendant was $13,250.00, which
undoubtedly related to periods of time that the parties lived
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together. Defendant on the other hand, claimed that during
the three-plus years they lived together he spent approximate.
$30, 000. 00 for the support of the plaintiff and his children.
The court in following the trial court did not adopt the defedants claim for satisfaction.

The opinion states:

"His claim is based on his own testimony
as to his income during that period and
on his assumption that it was all paid
for support of the plaintiff and the
children. The difficulty with the
defendant's ar ument is that the trial
court was not
osition nor
ence.
Anyone w o as any acquaintence
with family living will empathise with
the view of the trial court that the
defendants position is impractical and
unrealistic." (emphasis added) 576 P.2d
at 886.
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court in granting
the equity in a home purchased by the two parties in lieu ofi
judgement for back payments in the total amount claimed. In
the instant case the trial court correctly refused to accept
many of plaintiff's claims for satisfaction undoubtedly becau;
of the uncertainty of the amounts as having been actually givr
from out of plaintiff's own money, and because of the failure
of these claims to apply to Utah law.

c

Plaintiff Should Not be Relieved from the Divorce
Decree Obligations during the Time that the Parties
Lived Together
Plaintiff raises for the first time on appeal the point
that he should be relieved of any formal child support and ai:

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

- 45 -

obligations of the divorce decree, from February through Novanber of 1976 while the parties lived together,

Plaintiff did

not seek credit for the entire amount during that period at
the trial court level but instead attempted to show some satisfaction of the obligations by the various checks introduced at
the trial.

The court has reiterated on numerous occasions

that it cannot pass on matters raised for the first time on
appeal.

See for example, Simpson v. General Motors Corporation,

24 Utah 2d. 301, 470 P.2d 399, 401 (1970)
Apart from failure of plaintiff to raise this point in
the lower court plaintiff is probably not entitled to the
benefit of this claim by reasQn of Utah law.

Although it is

not known whether this identical point was raised by defendant
in Ciraulo v. Ciraulo, supra, clearly the court did not credit
amounts for the period of time the parties in that case lived
together.
Further, the case of Stanton v. Stanton, supra, is relevant to this issue as the defendant and father therein was
claiming relief from the $100.00 a month obligation that he owed
for child support during the period that his son was living with
him for three months.

The court in Stanton

required defendant

to pay the $300.00 to plaintiff even though he had paid the
expenses of the child while living with him during the three
month period.

Defendant sees no reason why the instant case be

considered any differently.
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If the court is inclined to relive plaintiff of obligations simply because the parties apparently reconciled and
lived together, defendant submits that the relief should not
be afforded during the period that plaintiff and defendant
resided in the home with defendants parents, the Robinsons.
For the most part during that period of February through
September of 1976 the expenses for the home and the meals wer:
paid by ¥..r - Robinson, with plaintiff's overall contribution
of $400. 00 and defendants contribution of approximately $1,4u

(T. 21, 46-48, 95)
POINT IV
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REDUCING
PLAINTIFF'S ALIMONY OBLIGATIONS TO
DEFENDANT IN THE AMOUNT OF $5,000.00
REPRESENTING AN AMOUNT PAID BY PLAINTIFF TOWARD A DOWN PAYMENT OF A HOME.
Defendant's Cross-Appeal is not based on any part of th1
modification proceedings regardless of what plaintiff states:
his brief.

The cross-appeal is based only on the question of

law as to whether plaintiff should be given credit for $5,00~
toward alimony as he paid approximately that amount towards

a

down payment of a home purchased by the parties in September 1
1976. (Conclusion of law No. 5)

Defendant fails to see why tl

particular payment should be considered any differently than'
other payments claimed as

satisfaction that were not granteO'

the trial court.
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It should again be observed that plaintiff has considered
from the very begining that the home purchased by the parties
was his own home and merely a place for the defendant and the
children to reside for a period of time, and without giving
defendant any interest in the home. (T. 24,-26, 175}
always been

It has

plaintiff's intention therefore, to fully recoup

his $5,000.00 payment and to gain whatever equity would accrue
as a result of that investment.

At the same time that plaintiff

filed the instant action to modify the divorce decree he filed
the quiet title action already referred to in this brief to
remove defendant from possession and any interest in the home.
Nothing in the trial courts order provided defendant directly
with the use and or ownership of the home.
Furthermore, there is again no evidence that defendant
agreed or consented to allow the $5,000.00 payment to be considered satisfaction of the alimony obligations and because
palintiff cannot unilaterally confer benefits to the defendant,
if indeed this is a benefit, as a substitution for the divorce
decree obligations, the court clearly cormnitted error and abused
its discretion by allowing this credit to plaintiff.

CONCLUSION
Defendant, Mrs. Ross, contends that the trial courts
decision granting her judgement against plaintiff for arrearages
in child support and alimony should be affirmed by this court.
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Plaintiff has not met his burden in establishing that the
doctrines of "equitable estoppel" and/or "laches" apply in
the instant case to relieve him from the obligations of the
divorce decree.

The trial court held and the prepondenrance

of the evidence revealed the fact,

(1) there were never any

"representations" on the part of defendant to relieve or forgi·
the arrearages. and (_2) plaintiff has not suffered a sufficier
and substantial detriment to rely on the equitable doctrines.
Further it is clear that plaintiff cannot rely on any
alleged agreements entered into between plaintiff and defendar
or plaintiff and a representative of defendant through the St;
of Utah to relieve him from "future support obligations" , a:
such agreements are void for reasons of public policy and fai!
for lack of consideration.
The trial court did not commit error in refusing to allt
many items claimed as satisfaction of the divorce decree obli·
gations of plaintiff inasmuch as the law in the State of Utah
does not allow a substitution of benefits or "unilateral" pa)'t0
to satisfy the divorce decree obligations, and plaintiff didt
meet his burden in establishing that said payments were actual
made by him.
Finally it is defendants position that the trial courti
commit error in allowing a credit towards the payment of alirnl'.
in the amount of $5, 000. 00 representing the amount plaintiffi'
· s in
toward the down payment of a home purchased by the partie
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